Can Europe Break Its Dependence on Chinese Clean Tech? | The New Industrialists

November 16, 2026

Almost every solar panel Europe imports comes from China. Batteries are heading the same way.

Europe has tried once to build its own battery champion. It launched the European Battery Alliance in 2017, backed Northvolt with public loans and lined up carmakers as buyers. Northvolt went bankrupt anyway, and China's biggest battery maker, CATL, is now building plants in Hungary and Spain.

Ann Mettler is president and co-founder of Catalyse Europe. From 2014 to 2019 she ran the European Commission's in-house think tank, and until 2025 she led Breakthrough Energy's work in Europe. She argues that anything plugging into critical infrastructure should be made by countries Europe can trust, even when that costs more.

In this episode:

  • Her part in the Northvolt story, and why she still calls it picture-perfect European industrial policy
  • Why Reagan's approach to Japanese automakers is the wrong model for China
  • What she'd require of Chinese factories in Hungary and Spain, from local content to tech transfer
  • The 5G rollout where Europe had Ericsson and Nokia and bought Huawei anyway
  • Drones, humanoid robots, and why the battery supply chain is a defense supply chain
  • Co-shoring, her less patronizing version of friend-shoring, and why a club of middle powers isn't enough

Links:

Energy Empire: https://energyempire.fm

The NEIS Center: https://neiscenter.org

Catalyse Europe: https://catalyse-europe.org/about/

Europe's Electric Backbone, a strategy for batteries: https://catalyse-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Europes-Electric-Backbone.pdf

Mark Carney's Davos speech on middle powers: https://www.weforum.org/stories/forum-in-focus/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada

Transcript

INTRO

Jigar Shah: I'm Jigar Shah.

Sarah Ladislaw: And I'm Sarah Ladislaw, founding director of the New Energy Industrial Strategy Center. This is The New Industrialists, an eight-part series from Energy Empire, made in partnership with the NEIS Center. Every week we talk to people who are doing it. What works, what doesn't, and what it usually takes.

Jigar Shah: This is going to be a fascinating conversation, because I have never found Ann Mettler to be soft-spoken. Fun is going to be had, that is for sure.

Sarah Ladislaw: Ann is not only an expert in her field, having served in the European government for a period of time, but also a real and true energy expert. She also ran Breakthrough Energy Ventures over in Europe for a while. One of the things that's going to be super helpful in our conversation with Ann is navigating the complexity of all the different things Europe is undertaking right now, and helping us figure out which are really promising and which remain more convoluted, where it's harder to tell whether they're going to make any headway.

Jigar Shah: Even people who are very knowledgeable about the world really don't understand that the EU is not the same sort of federal government as the United States. People talk about Europe as a federation of states, or whatever you want to call it. But they're all member countries, so they can make their own decisions, and the EU doesn't really have the ability to force them to do one thing or another. So as you navigate this, you really do have to bring everybody along. And there are lots of things going on, whether it's the Ukraine conflict or the meddling in Hungary that was occurring and now is not. There are all sorts of dynamics within Europe that I think we as Americans have a really hard time processing.

Sarah Ladislaw: I think that's exactly right. We spend a lot of time at the NEIS Center working with partners in Europe, including Catalyse Europe. What's always really difficult is that they have this massive laundry list of pressures on them, whether it's security and defense, the energy system, or their overall competitiveness picture, which they're very concerned about. Say Brussels puts out a perfectly laid out plan for dealing with all of those circumstances. It's really hard to figure out how to get all of the member states to go along with it, how to finance it, how to get the member state policies to line up, and how to create the capital overlay and the right signals in Europe to get all of that to flow. It's enormously complex and politically complicated. It's really hard to figure out where the pressure points are to push on, to get even the change that many political leaders across the European spectrum want to see. So I give Europe a lot of high marks for navigating a lot of really complicated things all at once. But at the same time, this is one of those areas where I think some simplification could help Europe get through some of these challenges.

Jigar Shah: For a hot second there was some sense that if the US was taking a step back, the Europeans would take a step forward. And I think they want to. But with the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, they clearly have much higher price pressures on commodities. They still have the Ukraine conflict. It's not resolved, and in some ways it's accelerating a little bit. So there's a lot on their minds, and I can't think of a better person than Ann to take us through it.

Sarah Ladislaw: Yeah, I agree.

PICTURE-PERFECT INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Jigar Shah: Ann, welcome to Energy Empire.

Ann Mettler: I'm delighted to be here.

Jigar Shah: You have had an extraordinary career. We're not going to recount all of it. But you served on the Commission, you ran Breakthrough Energy in Europe, and through that you met a lot of climate tech companies. You have thought about how to support industrial strategy in Europe. You went through the Northvolt debacle. After all that experience, and seeing what worked and what didn't, what do you think Europe's play is in industrial strategy?

Ann Mettler: Let me say, in general, Europe is always very well intentioned but has real challenges in operationalizing these plans. Northvolt is a really interesting case, because to me that was picture-perfect European industrial policy. And I can say I was part of the Northvolt story. When I served in the Commission from 2014 to 2019, it was clear that electromobility was coming, that the key component was the battery, and that we were not in the game. I raised awareness at every occasion I had, because I don't need to tell you how big and how important the European automotive industry is.

Then one day, the gentleman who ran my sustainable development team came in and said, there's a guy, he used to work at Tesla, he's an engineer, and he wants to start a battery company. And I was like, in with this guy, please. We did a whole event with him, and that was the CEO of Northvolt. So we helped make connections to the European Investment Bank. We basically relaxed state aid policy. We made sure that there was offtake. We lined up European car companies. We found a good organization to manage the European Battery Alliance. But then basically everyone thought, this is just going to happen now. And then it didn't.

So to me, Northvolt is much bigger than just a battery company that failed. It had real collateral damage, because Europe had real ambition, and I think it had what it took, in principle, to become a leader in clean tech. I don't need to tell you, we already missed digital tech. But I thought clean tech would build on our strengths. This is about engineering. This is about deep tech. This is also about technology with a purpose. Remember that the climate agenda in Europe was an overriding objective. So we didn't deliver, and that's really disappointing.

REPLACING ONE DEPENDENCY WITH ANOTHER

Sarah Ladislaw: Take a step back for a second, because one of the challenges in Europe is that it has so many competing pressures to deal with. There are the competitiveness and technology angles you're talking about. There's also the energy piece. Europe was dependent on gas from Russia for a long time, and now you've got the Strait of Hormuz situation. So energy security, the pressure on imported energy, has been a tension point Europe has dealt with for a long time. Now it's thinking about moving much more aggressively, as Ursula von der Leyen said again in the State of the Union recently. But there are dependencies there too, because those technologies don't exist at scale on a manufacturing basis in Europe. So when you talk to European policymakers and industry about those two challenges, getting off one type of dependence and onto another type of technology without growing a new dependence, how do you help them navigate it?

Ann Mettler: Well, the track record, unfortunately, is not great. If you look at the share of fossil fuel imports, it has grown in Europe in the last 20 years, despite all the talk of wanting to be a climate leader. We've become more dependent on fossil fuels. At the same time, and you alluded to this, we became more dependent on China in clean technologies. We lost the entire solar industry. We were late to batteries, and then pretty much lost that as well. So this is not a pretty picture. It really pains me to say this, because you cannot replace one dependency with another, and you certainly shouldn't be adding another dependency.

So for me, diversification is an urgent priority at this point, because these changes don't take place overnight. We need to diversify so that we become less dependent on individual countries and individual companies. At the same time, we need to do everything we can to build out homegrown sources of energy. That means renewables, with the caveat that the solar panels pretty much all come from China, but still. It really needs a comprehensive plan for how we reduce these dependencies, because at this point it's a matter of urgency.

EUROPE LOST SOLAR IN LESS THAN 15 YEARS

Sarah Ladislaw: And those clean tech dependencies are a little bit different from the fossil fuel ones. How do you help draw a line there, to say it's not about keeping all Chinese technology out, or about indigenizing all of those supply chains? How do you think about that?

Ann Mettler: The first thing to understand about solar is that Europe spent years, if not decades, getting the technology off the ground. A lot was invested in this industry, and we completely lost it in less than 15 years. We need to keep that in mind. If I look at today, what's the backbone of the energy transition? It's very much solar and batteries. Demand for those has gone through the roof. So in hindsight, was it smart for Europe to let the entire industry it invested so much in disappear because we were not cost competitive? Or would we be better off today if Europe had stayed in the game and we hadn't lost these manufacturing capabilities? Because only when you're in the game can you be part of future innovations. I think we needed to think this through. As I said, the backbone of our energy transition is very much predicated on solar, and 90% of the solar panels come from China. No one in this geopolitical environment can tell me that's a good thing.

JAPAN WAS NEVER A SYSTEMIC COMPETITOR

Jigar Shah: But play that out for me. In the 1980s, when the US automakers were under attack from Japanese automakers, Ronald Reagan basically said, fine, you can ship us cars, but we want the plants here, and we want you to use American workers. CATL and BYD are doing that in Hungary. So there's that set of things, and I'd like your opinion on that. On the other side, you have diversification that comes from other countries. You don't necessarily have to buy from China. India is clearly ramping up its manufacturing capacity, and so are Turkey, Jordan, Ethiopia and others. So there are other strategies around friend-shoring, if you assume Europe can't make certain technologies cost effectively because of labor standards or whatever it is, and so you want them made somewhere else. Paint a picture of the tools you have to choose from, and which ones are acceptable and which are less acceptable.

Ann Mettler: That's a very meaty question. The first thing I'll say, because I know this argument about Japanese cars: at no time do I think the United States saw Japan as a systemic competitor. The EU itself describes China as a systemic competitor. So this is not just competition in the market. This is competition for political systems. That's very important to understand.

In that vein, take what you say about greenfield investment: isn't it a good thing they're investing in Europe? China is investing primarily in Hungary, and that took place under the previous government of Viktor Orbán, which, as you know, is both very Russia-friendly and very China-friendly. Now Spain is also seeing big inflows of greenfield investment. Two considerations here. Number one, it's not a coincidence that these investments flow to countries that are extraordinarily friendly to China. So there are also political motivations here.

Secondly, these are not the kind of joint ventures we saw in China, when our companies went there and really had to share a lot of their IP and give real ownership to China. I don't see those kinds of joint ventures playing out in Europe yet. So we need to be very clear. When a Chinese company builds greenfield facilities in Europe, a lot of the tools we need, be it trade defense or the anti-subsidy regulation, can no longer be applied. When these greenfield facilities are built, the value chain and the supply chain are going to be Chinese. So it's very difficult for me to see how European companies could compete with that.

So I am not categorically against it, but if we do this, we need to have our eyes wide open. Domestic content requirements, employing Europeans, real tech and knowledge transfer. Because at least from what I have heard, the battery technologies being built in Europe are three or four years old. So let's not think this is the most cutting-edge battery technology China has. My only plea is that we have our eyes wide open, and recognize that these are not going to be the kind of joint ventures we did with the Chinese when we went into their market. They, of course, also learned from that experience. They're not as naive as we were, and apparently still are.

ONLY A UNITED EUROPE STANDS A CHANCE

Sarah Ladislaw: What you just laid out is an extremely nuanced position, which very much resonates with the way I look at things as well. But it's really hard to translate into policy. It's hard at the Brussels level, and it's even more complicated at the nation-state level. Member states have to decide how much foreign direct investment they want and the criteria for that investment. How are you seeing that conversation play out between Brussels and the member states that are thinking about foreign direct investment and how to manage all these tech transfer issues?

Ann Mettler: That's a very important question. First of all, I think it's Brussels' job to explain what is happening. Even if you don't always have proof, it's important to anticipate how this may play out. And the one thing I know is that in this world, only a united Europe stands even a remote chance of standing up to the other superpowers. So it's very important that we don't dilute that European strength, and that is basically what is happening. You call it a nuanced position. I think it's time for democratic governments to wake up and understand what's happening here.

When I came into the Commission in 2014, we still talked about China as a developing country. China was still receiving development aid. By the time I left in 2019, we referred to it as a systemic competitor. Five years. So everything unfolding here is happening at record speed. I remember telling people when I left that the world is in a competition for technology supremacy. I use the word supremacy very deliberately, because there will be a winner and there will be a loser. If you think about quantum computing, for instance, the winner in quantum will be able to crack encryption. That means even sovereigns won't be able to keep state secrets anymore. So this is a race, and we need to understand that. That's why these issues around energy technologies and clean technologies can't be seen in isolation from other technologies. At this point, I would say we're in a technology arms race, and the West is losing.

WE DON'T BUY OUR WEAPONS FROM CHINA BECAUSE THEY'RE CHEAPER

Jigar Shah: So think about the German solar manufacturing base from 2004 to 2008, 2009. If all of the technologies had played out the way we know historically they did, the Germans probably would have gotten to, pick a number, 20 euro cents per watt, 22 euro cents per watt. The Chinese were at 12 euro cents per watt. So it still would have come down in cost, but it wouldn't have gone down to 12. Around 2012, 2013, SolarWorld was making this argument, before you joined the Commission. They were saying we need to close the borders to Chinese imports. And the folks deploying solar panels said, no, we want the extra 10 cents in discounts, or whatever it is.

You can say, okay, solar was in the past. Now we're talking about batteries, and the same argument applies. The US decided it didn't have the capability to manufacture batteries in the United States, so it brought in technology from Panasonic, from LG, from Samsung, from SK. These are Korean and Japanese names, and they're more expensive than the Chinese. But we still have eight more rounds of technology breakthroughs coming in batteries, so presumably this will play out the same way it did in the solar industry. So the question becomes, what set of tools would you expect the West to put in place to make sure that what happened with solar doesn't happen again, this time with batteries?

Ann Mettler: It's a very good question. Let me first say that if cost competitiveness was really an objective of European policymaking, we have utterly failed. Not just for a year or two, but for easily two or three decades, because we've done everything to drive up costs for companies. So for us to wake up now and say, oh, we're not cost competitive, is frankly a joke.

So where does that leave us? I am personally very disappointed with economists for not helping us calculate costs differently, pricing in security, sovereignty, the loss of industrial fabric, the loss of skills, the loss of R&D. I don't believe that having everything made in China and shipped to Europe is ultimately cheaper. Quite the contrary.

I went through that experience at the Commission when we were deploying 5G. To the average policymaker, it was just, oh, we'll surf the internet a little bit faster. But 5G connects everything with everything. 5G is the digital infrastructure of your country. We had two players in the game, Ericsson and Nokia, but we ended up buying Huawei. I mean, 60% of Germany's digital connectivity is Chinese. So we need to be careful about these things.

What I always say is, we also don't procure our weapons from China because they're cheaper there. There are certain things we need to be able to make, even if it's more expensive. That doesn't mean autarky. It doesn't mean we have to do everything ourselves. But it means that everything that plugs into critical infrastructure needs to be made by friends, by countries we can trust, where we don't have to fear that they will cut us off or put export controls on what we need.

And here it's really important to understand the battery. Batteries are highly relevant to defense, because drones are powered by batteries. Humanoid robots, which will certainly be part and parcel of future warfare, are powered by batteries. So the battery supply chain is a defense supply chain, and we need to think this through. I really applaud what the United States has done here: understanding that it can't do it alone, but at least doing it with friends, and being willing to pay the price. I think that's a positive alternative to the way we've often done it in Europe, where it's just, what is the absolute cheapest? No questions asked.

THE BATTERY BACKBONE

Sarah Ladislaw: Catalyse Europe has come out with a battery strategy and is doing some organizing around this concept of a battery backbone in Europe. What does that look like? To your point, I think it's completely fair to say we've underrated the cost of losing industrial capacity, for a whole lot of economic, innovation and national security reasons. But there's a flip side to the question: how much does it cost, and what does that backbone look like? How are you thinking about what a sufficient battery backbone looks like in Europe, and how is that being communicated?

Ann Mettler: First of all, we purposefully called it the backbone and not the battery initiative, because there are certain technologies, what we also call gateway technologies, that are the springboard for future technologies. And broadly speaking, I think European strategy here is still completely rudimentary. After Northvolt, basically no one wants to touch batteries anymore, because no one wants to be associated with failure. That is a big mistake.

We need to understand that in the electrified economy, and there is now a lot of political consensus around electrification, the battery becomes the general purpose technology. It will cut across all sectors of the economy, and it's also a gateway technology. For instance, I spoke to an investor who came back from China recently. Robotics is obviously the next big thing, and China is leading again. So I asked, who is investing in robotics? Who's really making this happen? He said battery companies and EV companies. And we don't have those companies. My point is that technologies feed off one another. If you missed the boat on one technology, chances are you're not going to lead in the next one. That's why we call it a backbone. The battery is the backbone of the electrified economy.

I think Europe has about a three-year window to put together a comprehensive strategy that builds on the battery capacity we have. We have a stronger starting point than we had in 2017, when the European Battery Alliance was launched, but now it's a matter of political leadership to really pull this together. Where can we scale? How do we create what I call a sovereignty premium? No, it will not be cheaper, but it's still worth investing in. And how do we work with the military? Because I have personally lost confidence that civilian administrations can do this with the speed and determination that is needed.

NO ONE IS ORGANIZING THIS

Jigar Shah: One thing on my mind: Mark Carney gave that big speech at Davos about how a lot of countries need to come together, which I think is part of what you're saying. That would include Canada, Australia, probably Japan, and others. So I'm curious what the organizing effort looks like. You're talking about Europe, and Europe is now spending more on defense as a percentage of GDP, so maybe the military would drive this. But there's also buying power in Canada. There are a lot of feedstocks available out of Australia. And India already has mandates for reshoring battery manufacturing. I think they're using Chinese technology, but they might be persuaded to use other people's. So I'm trying to understand who organizes this. I don't mean to be a pesky American, but it does feel like America was doing a lot of that heavy lifting during the Biden administration, and I don't really see the baton being fully handed off to another group of countries, Mark Carney's speech notwithstanding.

Ann Mettler: No, I don't disagree with that. There is no one really organizing this. Even worse, I would argue that at the level of governments, the importance of technology across the board is still not being approached strategically. Remember, I said we're basically in a technology arms race.

One of the things I'm working on in the background: Sarah, you said friend-shoring, and I'm working on something I call co-shoring. This is not offshoring, and it's not nearshoring. It's another kind of friend-shoring, but maybe less patronizing, because co-shoring to me means you're really equal. If we are the offtaker, we work together with a country where things can be produced cost competitively, maybe still not as cheaply as in China, but where we do it to mutual benefit. I'm working on a solar project in South Africa, and with European institutions, where I'm saying co-shoring is really the way to do it. Because the alliance of middle powers you're referring to is also not enough. Even if we had that alliance of middle powers, they would still have to reach out to countries in the Global South and find ways of working with them that are to mutual benefit.

So unfortunately, no one is organizing this. My first-order priority would be to have people in government who don't hold individual mandates for clean tech, for digital tech, for AI, for biotech, but who really see the bigger picture and understand the importance of being at the technology frontier, which is slowly but surely migrating to China.

OVER-GOVERNED AND TOO SLOW

Sarah Ladislaw: I think we have a propensity, when we talk about these issues in Europe, to talk about policymaking, because there's such a robust policymaking apparatus. But one of the things I think you do very well is talk with the investor and company side of the equation too. I travel around the world talking to people about these issues as well, and there are real differences in how companies feel about the national projects they're engaged in. Have you seen a shift? How do European companies view their ability to compete in the ways everyone knows we need to, which are really hard when you haven't been operating that way for a while?

Ann Mettler: Completely. And to be clear, in defense of European companies, we still have a number of globally competitive companies that are really good. Trust me, if you can deal with the European red tape and all the obligations you have and still manage to be globally competitive, you're a good company. So first of all, let's build on what we have.

If I look at successful economic models around the world, China is basically a masterclass in policy planning. You have very strong government mandates and targets. They write it all down, and then they execute. Then you have the United States, which is more focused on markets, and that's a successful model as well. The IRA was very different from our Green Deal in that it really tried to empower companies and free up investment. I quoted Jennifer Granholm yesterday, who said it's private sector led and government enabled. That's very different from Europe, where it was sort of government led and government enabled, and that just doesn't work.

The point is, in Europe we have layers and layers of governance. I always say Europe isn't just overregulated, it's over-governed, because you have the regional level, the national level and the European level. We need to figure out how all of that can be much better aligned than it is now. That can also mean doing less, because there's always the instinct that we need another strategy, that we need to pile something on top. This is where I think we need to look back, rather than always looking forward, and ask what we can get rid of because it's just in the way and isn't adding value. That's an exercise I would encourage, because I think speed needs to become much more of a guiding principle in how we govern today. On balance, we are too slow and too complex, and that's not only an economic liability but increasingly a security liability.

EUROPE IS ALREADY IN A HYBRID WAR

Jigar Shah: Well, we have never been more impressed by Ann Mettler, who is constantly bringing extraordinary energy and power to this conversation. I think what you're suggesting is the right prescription, but I think it's going to require an enormous amount of culture change.

Ann Mettler: Yes. But can I say, Europe, for all practical purposes, is already in a hybrid war. When I come to the United States, I realize you don't yet understand how serious the situation is. We're really close to places where real, actual war is taking place. I'm not really concerned that it'll spread, but it's a hybrid war, and it's something we don't fully understand. That's why, on issues such as critical infrastructure, trusted suppliers, and who we can really work with if the situation deteriorates further, we need to have our eyes wide open. As we always used to say at the Commission, hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. It's really time to prepare for the worst, and to come together with people, organizations and countries we can trust.

I think a lot of that won't be orchestrated by government, because democracies by nature are very inward looking. They're mostly busy managing the crisis of the day. That's why I believe initiatives like mine, and also like yours, Sarah, are so needed: to bring new thinking, to build bridges across the Atlantic and other geographies, and to show a new way. I spoke to someone from the Rockefeller Foundation yesterday about co-shoring, because they care so much about these issues. Governments need new paradigms and new ways of thinking about this, and I think a lot of the impulses will come from outside government. I feel a lot of resonance in the work I do, but I also know this is a big effort of coalition building, so that together we can push forward an agenda that not only rebuilds industrial capacity and competitiveness, but builds resilience, security and sovereignty in what is a very volatile geopolitical age.